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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
Plaimtiff, 
vs. 
LOCAL UNION 967, JOINT COUN-
CIL 67, WESTERN CONFER-
ENCE OF TEAMSTERS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD oF TEAMSTERS, CHAUF-
F E U R S , WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
AFL-CIO, MILO B. RASH, CLAR-





APPELLANTS' REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
Point No. I. 
Concerted Action 
Respondent first quotes from the record and empha-
sizes that the ne~al employer (.as distinguished from 
the neutral employees) was indeed appealed to, which, 
of course, appellants admit. Respondent then proceeds 
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to deny that Harry Rosen was a supervisor, conceding 
instead that he was a foreman. Regardless of how Harry 
Rosen is labeled, the facts remain as they appear in the 
record and as quoted on Page 47 of appellants' brief, 
wherein Harry Rosen testifies as elicited by Mr. Arthur 
Allen that he was employed as a supervisor and that he 
supervised the loading and unloading of merchandise in 
and out of Dorman's place of business and further that 
he was indeed .a supervisor of the only other employee 
of Dorman referred to in the record: Mr. Nigro. 
Respondent failed to show in its brief any appeal 
by the Union to anyone other than Harry Rosen. It is 
therefore somewhat perplexing when they add that wit-
nesses Fredrico and Gywallskog make it ''crystal clear 
that Dorman's employees refused to unload the cheese 
and that these refusals extended from July 26 through 
September 7. '' 
Now, the facts are that neither Fredrico or Gywell-
skog were present during, nor do they testify about, 
the events of July 26 and 27 when the picketing took 
place - at least the only picketing which can in any 
way be attributed to the defendants. There w.as no 
picketing whatsoever on Septe1nber 7 when these two 
witnesses drove into the New York dock with their load. 
Neither of these two witnesses refer at all to an 
attempt by any of the defendants to influence Donnan's 
employees to concerted action. On transcript page 151, 
Fredrico testifies .as follows: 
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''Harry Rosen said, 'What are you fellows doing 
here~' Art was the senior truck driver and said, 'We 
are here with a load of cheese.' Harry said, 'I can't 
unload you, you'll have to wait until the Dormans get 
here.' Q: What did you do after that~ A: vV e wait~d 
for the Dormans and the Dormans came down and said, 
• We will have to call the Union '* * * ' and he called the 
Union, and, I guess he didn't get no result, so Art, 
the senior truck driver, asked Mr. Dorman if he could 
speak to the shop steward, and he said, 'Sure.' I called 
the shop steward, Harry, and Art asked them, 'Could 
you fellows unload the cheese~' Art said, 'No, we can't 
the Union won't let us." The witness here fails so say 
what Harry told Art. But Art, not Harry (Rosen) said 
"No, we can't [unload], the Union won't let us." If this 
hearsay statement ·of Art is true, the Union referred to 
was neither of the defendants, for the picketing of the 
defendants was limited to July 26 and 27. The witness 
here refers only to Harry Rosen, the supervisor, and Mr. 
Dorman. An employee is not mentioned. 
Thus, Respondent hasn't yet shown us any evidence 
that appellants attempted to influence Dorman's em-
ployees to engage in concerted action as a means of 
accomplishing their object. 
Next, respondent quotes from the testimony of Mr. 
Gossner (page 89), who says that Victor Dorman told 
him that "our employees don't want to unload any more 
Dairy Distributors' cheese. Don't send any more with 
Dairy Distributors' trucks.'' 
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This is hearsay and self-serving, and quite contrary 
to the facts. So let's see what Victor Dorman actually 
says. Mr. Allen is interrogating Victor Dorman as to the 
events of July 26 - the day of the very brief picketing 
by defendant, Joint Council 67. Mr. Allen asks Dorman 
if he had a conversation with Mr. Ristuccia, the head 
of the local in Dorman's area. "A: In the late afternoon, 
I believe the very same day he was in our building, 
and during the course of conversation, I mentioned the 
fact that he had stopped our truck. He said, 'I did not 
stop your truck.' I said, 'That is not so; you did stop 
the truck; 1ny men were willing to unload it; and if 
you didn't stop it, it would have been unloaded.' He 
said, 'I didn't stop it.' I said, 'Are you saying that you 
are not stopping the truck~' He said, 'I am not saying 
anything.' Whereupon, I instructed the loader and my 
men to unload the truck, and we ordered it back from 
the parking lot to our front door and unloaded it'." 
It is obvious here that Victor Dorman is not being 
influenced by his employees- that in fact the employees 
needed only to be told by Dorman what to do and 
they did it. 
What is apparent from this is that Dorman was 
greatly influenced by the man who was in charge of 
the New York Local and w.as altogether too ready to 
assume that Mr. Ristuccia had taken a position which 
in fact he hadn't taken. That Dorman would have been 
influenced by what Ristucca m~gkt request is under-
standable because he it is with whom Dorman negotiates 
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contracts concerning all of the Donnan employees, who 
numbered approximately sixty-five p€Ople. 
\Ve emphasize that the .above quoted testimony of 
Victor Dorman in no way indicates that Dorman's em-
ployees were concerting to induce Dorman to prevail 
upon Gossner. On the contrary, it necessarily shows only 
one fact: That the employees were entirely subserviant 
to the desires and demands of their employer - which 
of course destroys the entire foundation of respondent's 
claim of liability. 
The reason the unloader employees, if there were 
any, did not unload the cheese during the brief periods 
when the trucks were not unloaded, is that they followed 
the instructions of supervisor, Harry Rosen, who said, 
"I refused to unload it." (Tr. 132, L3, 17-19). So when 
respondent makes the point that Dormans never told 
the employees not to unload, it is probably true that, 
if there were ·any such employees to be so instructed, 
they were not instucted directly by the Dormans; but 
they certainly were so instructed by and through their 
supervisor, Harry Rosen. 
That the picketing did influence the Dorman brothers 
appears evident from the ready assumption which Victor 
Dorman made that Ristuccia was in some way involved 
in the picketing. The picketing had its effect directly upon 
the employer. It was not an inducement to concerted 
action of the employees. 
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CERTIFICATION 
Respondent says "The second announced purpose 
of the appellants was to force Gossner as manager of 
the Cache Valley Dairy Association to recognize and 
bargain with the Local Union in Ogden as the representa-
tive of his employees. This they could not lawfully do 
unless they had been certified as the representative of 
aid employees under the provisions of the Act.'' This 
last sentence does not meet the argument in Appellant's 
brief wherein we say that an actual, existing bargaining 
status of a union plus subsequent official recognition 
thereof by the Board is at least the equivalent of being 
certified by the Board. Concerning the balance of the 
above quoted statement, it was never our ''announced 
purpose" or our purpose at all to force Gossner to 
"recognize" the Ogden Local as bargaining representa-
tive. The purpose the Union had was to get Gassner 
to bargain. The Union was already recognized, and all 
that we have said in our brief in distinguishing these 
concepts appears not to haYe been understood by re-
spondent. The difference between getting Gossner to 
recognize the Union and getting Gossner to bargain 
with the Union which had a recognized status, is the 
crux of tllis problem. Being recognized as the bargain-
ing agent and getting Gossner to bargain "ith that 
agent are two vastly different things. 
The Board itself recognized this difference when it 
observed the Ogden Loc.al 's recognized status and then 
ordered Gossner to Bargain with that Union. 
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Respondent then says that it is a strange rule of 
law which would permit a Union to be a bargaining agent 
for employees when membership in that Union was 
"suspended" by the Union, confirmation of which, re-
spondent says, appeared in the picket sign where the 
employees were referred to as ''non union employees.'' 
If this is strange law, then the Taft Act itself must 
be considered strange law because it is a necessary con-
clusion of Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and of 14(b) that it is 
quite possible for a situation to develop wherein a union 
may represent a group of employees as its collective bar-
gaining agent without a single one ,of those employees 
being a union member. 
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) provides that: "This para-
graph shall not impair the right of a labor organization 
to prescribe its own rules with respect to acquisition or 
retention of membership therein.'' As long as the rules 
are uniformly applied to all employees it's conceivable 
that the bargaining agent may have to "suspend" its 
members if they failed to comply with the rules, as for 
example the payment of dues, which, in fact, were not 
being paid by Gossner's employees during the period 
of time in question. Whether a bargaining agent re-
mains a bargaining agent and whether an employee 
remains a union member are determined by rules re-
spectively which are quite different, and in no way is 
one dependent upon the other as respondent infers. 
Furthermore, Utah has a "Right to Work" law, 
which the Taft Act permits under 14 (b) of the Act. 
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Section 10 (34-16-10, UCA) of that Act appears, how-
ever, to be an exercise of a power which Section 14 (b) 
failed to grant the State because it says, ''No employer 
shall require any person to pay any dues, fees, or other 
charges of any kind to any labor union*** as a condition 
of employment.'' Section 14 (b) reads: 
''Nothing in this Act shall be construed as 
authorizing the execution or application of agree-
ments requiring membership i·n a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment in any State 
or Territory in which such execution or applica-
tion is prohibited by State or Territorial law.'' 
Thus, the power granted to the States is limited to 
the prohibiting of ''agreements requiring membership 
in a labor organization." In the Utah Statute, such a 
requirement concerning membership is found in Section 
9 of the State law. Assuming Section 10 deals with a 
subject which the Federal Act pre-empts as expressed 
by the Indiana Superior Court in the recent case of 
Meade Electric Company vs. Hagberg, (.Jfay 19, 1958), 
42 LRR~f 2124, then in Utah, it is quite possible for a 
union, as the collective bargaining agent for a group 
of employees, to enter into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the mnployer and have a clause therein for the 
payment of dues to the bargaining agent as con1pensation 
for its bargaining services, with no requiren1ent whatso-
ever for those employees to becmne n1e1nbers of the union. 
We would have a situation that is popularly known as an 
"agency shop." The J.ll eade Electric Company case, 
supra, gives us a well-reasoned and highly instructive 
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opinion on this subject which quotes significantly from 
the debates which preceded the Taft Act. 
Whether a union represents a group of employees 
as their bargaining agent rests upon legal requiren1ents 
quite different from 1nembership requirements in that 
unwn even though this may, indeed, seem strange to 
some. 
Since the Board had already ordered Gossner to 
recognize the Ogden Local 976, it was no business of 
the employer if there had been friction between the 
Union and the employees. Actually there is little if any 
evidence of any such friction, but if there were, it was 
an issue entirely irrelevant to the question as to who 
was the employees' bargaining agent. If there were 
friction between the employees and their bargaining 
agent of a nature which was indeed harming the em-
ployees bargaining interest, it certainly was not a matter 
about which the employer should, or even want to, com-
plain. It was none of his concern. NLRB vs. Sansone 
Hosiery Mills, cited in Appellants' brief. 
AMBULATORY PICKETING 
Respondent begins its argument on this point by 
saying in effect that appellants' claim that they c.an 
violate the law with impunity and that they, therefore, 
make the law a nullity. This, of course, is not what 
appellants say. We say that where a business uses its 
own vehicles and its own drivers to move its own product, 
that vehicle and driver may be followed and picketed 
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wherever it comes to rest, because the picketing of the 
truck, or ambulatory situs, is primary picketing; and if a 
neutral employer at a "0ommon situs" is affected such 
effects are incidental and do not violate the Act. NLRB v. 
Service Trade Chauffeurs (Teamsters) 191 F. 2d 65, 28 
LRRM 2450. 
Respondent further fails to shed any light on the 
problem by saying, "The law does not sanction picketing 
for an unlawful purpose,'' with which we agree. In quot-
ing from page 63, 64 of appellants' brief, respondent 
·takes the quoted statement out of context and places an 
interpretation thereon that was not intended by appel-
lants. Appellants' brief proceeds to show that ambulatory 
picketing is primary picketing and is therefore lawful 
even though incidental adverse efects may result to a 
neutral employer because of the influence such picketing 
may have upon the neutral employees. Actually, we 
reiterate, that in this case there were no such incidental 
effects upon the neutral employees, but even if there 
were, we say that such effects would have been only 
incidental to the la-wful, prin1ary picketing, and therefore 
the picketing itself would be lawful. 
In quoting the luteruatioual Rice J.l!illiug Case in 
thej r brief appellants recognized the factual differences 
involved, hut WP contend that in spit of the factual dif-
ferelwes, the particular reference of the U.S. Supreme 
.Court in that ea~p as to what does not constitute con-
<'erted action is Y(~ry pertinent. If there had been any 
proof in the instant ca~e of a group of neutral en1ployees 
10 
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-being influenced by the picketing itself, then we agree 
that the factual differences would have raised a question 
as to the appropriateness of that citation but without 
any such evidence, we believe the following statement is 
apropos here: 
''A sufficient answer to this claimed viola-
tion of the section is that the Union's picketing 
and its encouragement of the men on the truck 
did not amount to such an inducement or en-
couragement to 'concerted' activity as the section 
proscribes. While each case must be considered in 
the light of its surrounding circumstances, yet 
the applicable proscriptions of Paragraph 8 (b) 
( 4) are expressly limited to the inducement or 
encouragement of concerted conduct by the em-
ployees of the neutral employer.'' 
After applying the rule to the facts 1n that case 
and finding no concert, the Court continues : 
''In this case therefore we need not determine 
the specific objects toward which a Union's en-
couragement of concerted conduct must be dir-
ected in order to amount to an unfair labor prac-
tice under subsection (A) or (B) of 8 (b) (4)." 
We add this last quote of the Supreme Court to 
emphasize what we have heretofore argued which is that 
the principle of law is that plaintiffs must prove concert 
of action among neutral employees regardless of the 
nature or dissimilarity of the facts; and unless the plain-
tiff does prove such, there is no need or purpose to look 
at the problem of the objects of the picketing because 
the concert problem is a prerequisite of ,all else that 
11 
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follows in the Act, all of which we have developed in 
our brief. 
Respondent next objects to appellants' interpreta-
tion of the Schultz Refdgerated Service case as applied. 
to the instant case. They then proceed to enumerate 
the significant factual points of that case. We fail to 
see where any of these points would not fit the essentials 
of the instant case. 
GOSSNER'S UNIFIED OPERATIONS 
Respondent next appears to use the Campbell Coal 
case and the Service Trade Chauffeurs case as a weapon 
against appellants, based on the assumption that the 
Cache Valley Dairy Association was the primary em-
ployer and that the plaintiff, the Dairy Distributors, Inc. 
was not a primary employer but was a secondary com-
pany. The appellant has adopted the view, as did the trial 
court, that since Gossner was the sole owner, manager, 
employer and actual operator of both operations which 
processed and transported the cheese, .and since these 
operations, although technically under separate legal 
entities, were completely integrated and interdependent~ 
they must be regarded as a single operation for the 
purpose of the Taft Act. Respondent appears now to 
be challenging this proposition. 
A leading Board case in support of appellants' new 
is Marine Cooks .and Stewards - (Irwin-Lyons Lun1ber 
Company), 25 LRRl\f 1092. In this ease a lumber com-
pany cut the trees in the forest and processed tl1en1 at 
12 
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its saw mill. A separate public utility transport company 
transported the logs from the forest to the mill. The 
stock ownership .and managerial control of both com-
panies were vested in the same individuals. When a labor 
dispute arose with the lumber company, a union, instead 
of picketing the lumber company, picketed the transpor-
tation company. The transportation company stopped its 
operations, and secondary boycott charges were filed 
against the union. In clearing the union of the charges 
the Board emphasizes that the stock ownership .and man-
agerial control were vested, substantially, in the same 
individuals, ''and that both companies are, in effect, 
engaged in 'one straight line operation,' i.e., the Lumber 
Company cuts the logs, the Boom Company transports 
the logs down the river, and the Lumber Company saws 
the logs into lumber at the mill. On the basis of these 
facts * * the Boom Company is not a neutral or wholly 
unconcerned employer. * * * We therefore conclude * * '~ 
that the Respondent Unions h.ave not violated Section 
8 (b) ( 4) (A) of the Act." 
The same factors which point to unified activity 
where unions are charged with unfair practices, have 
been applied also where employers are so charged. In 
the Board case of Condenser Coporation, 6 LRRM 203 
(modified and enforced by CA 3, 10 LRRM 483) the 
Board cited common ownership and control of labor re-
lations matters as a ground for holding that a corporation 
was the employer of its subsidiary's employees for the 
purposes of the Act. And again the Board held a cor-
13 
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porate garment manufacturer responsible for unfair 
labor practices committed by a corporate contractor in 
view of the ownership and control of both corporations 
by members of the same family and the close integration 
of their operations ( NLRB vs. Somerset Classics Inc., 
26 LRRM 1376; enforced by CA 2, 29 LRR~i 2331; cert. 
denied by U.S. Sup. Ct., 30 LRRM 2711). 
Since respondent now premises some of its basic 
arguments on the idea that Gossner's respective cheese 
processing and transporting business entities are essent-
ially separate activities for purposes of the Act, we feel 
it is appropriate to show that, as far as the Act is con-
cerned, not only did Gossner's "straight line" activity 
include Cache Valley Dairy Association and Dairy Dis-
tributors Inc., but also included the Dorman business in 
New York. 
The dairymen, including dairyman Gossner, furnish 
milk to the cheese processing plant at Amalga, Utah, 
then Gossner, who pro1noted, and was the n10ving force 
in, the Association, ( tr. 8, 9) processes the 1nilk ''ith his 
own employees and at his own expense into S\\iss cheese 
at said plant, where, it is elai1ned, Gossner produces 
lllOl'<' ~\ri~s cheese than any place on earth; then approxi-
nlatel~· 50<;~ of eYerything Gossner produced was trans-
ported to Donnan's, son1e by Dairy Distributor. trucks, 
~onw hy Caclw \ .. aliPy Dairy .. Assoeiation trucks, some by 
~onunon cnrriPr trucks. It appears that it was entirely 
Uostwr 's dPcision and responsibility as to which 1neans 
of' transportation was to be used, for the Association 
14 
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meinbers wanted Gassner to assume the job (tr 12). 
Under the contract Gassner had with the Association, 
he was to devote his entire time to the business and at 
their request he was now including in the business the 
transport activity (tr. 12). Gassner received 15% of the 
gross profits, which meant that Cache Valley Dairy Asso-
ciation absorbed .all losses including losses from market 
fluctuations while Gassner assumed no risk ·Of loss, even 
when Dairy Distributors ''purchased'' cheese from Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, as will hereinafter appear. All 
orders by Dorman for Amalga cheese were placed with 
Gassner, who sometimes would bill via Cache Valley 
Dairy Association, and sometimes via Dairy Distributors • 
Inc. Dormans neither knew nor cared whether it was to 
come from one or the other. ( tr 290-295) Their only con-
cern was to get the cheese. The amount of cheese pur-
chased by Dorman from Gassner was of such volume as 
to be of great importance to Dorman so that they could 
not even consider the prospect of doing without it. Both 
Gassner and Dorman left no doubt that each was indis-
pensible to the other. ( tr 16, 337). 
This fact becomes even more clear from the facts 
which appear in the affidavit of Dean Corbett. This af-
fidavit indicates that on September 30, 1953, N. Dorman 
and Company loaned Dairy Distributors Inc. $25,000.00 
The loan was not paid back until January 21, 1956, during 
the liquidation of the plaintiff Con1pany (and not in 
January of 1955 which is inadvertently stated in error in 
the affidavit). There is no record of any interest pay-
15 
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menton this loan. Such a loan is understandable only in 
view of a closely unified and integrated operation be-
tween Gossner and Dorman. 
At the center of the entire operation was one man 
who could and did direct every activity between Cache 
Valley Dairy Association in Utah and N. Dorman and 
Company in New York. The unity between Dormans and 
Dairy Distributors, Inc., as great as it was, was, of 
course, not the completely unified thing "\Vhich existed 
between Dairy Distributors, Inc. and the cheese proces-
. sing part of Cache Valley Dairy Association. Illus-
trative of the key role Gossner played, and the power 
he had to manipulate the operation between the latter 
two business entities is the practice, as shown by said 
affidavit, that when the cheese was transferred from 
Cache Valley Dairy Association to Dairy Distributors 
Inc., it was never paid for until after it was delivered 
to Dorman, and Dorman had paid Dairy Distributors 
Inc. or Gossner direct. Then and then only was Cache 
Valley Dairy Association paid. There were no instru-
ments of security drawn for Cache Valley Dairy ~lssocia­
tion 's benefit to protect it. during the interim period. It 
need hardly be said that Caehe Yalley Dairy Association 
would never have permitted this if Gossner himself, for 
all practieal purposes. was not. in fact, c01npletely ident-
ified as both Caehe Valley D.airy ~\ssociation and Dairy 
Distributor~ Inc. Fr01n production at An1alga, Utah to 
marketiJ?.g at Dorn1ans in New York and the transportin~ 
hd wcPn, this was, indeed, a ''straight line operation··, 
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.and picketing one place is the same as picketing the other, 
because it's all essentially the same business with each 
segment wholly dependent upon the other. We can say 
with certainity that the unification is complete as be-
tween Cache Valley Dairy Association .and Dairy Dis-
tributors Inc. so far as the Act is concerned. And we 
believe it is also fair to say of Dormans tie-in with 
Gossner what the Board said of the Boom Company in 
the Irwin-Lyons Case: It is ''not .a neutral or wholly 
unconcerned employer.'' 
Next, respondent says that appellant fell into the 
same error with respect to the Moore Dry Dock case 
and again stresses that Dairy Distributors, Inc. "was 
not the primary employer .at the situs or at all'' and ''that 
the picketing clearly discloses (from the signs thern-
selves) that the dispute was clearly not with Dairy Dis-
tributors, Inc. but with the primary employers, Cache 
Valley Dairy Association. The above cited cases and 
.argument answer this point of respondent's. From where 
the Union could observe the Gossner operations, Gossner 
employed both the cheese processors and the truck 
drivers who hauled the cheese. He completely controlled 
both operations. So to the Union, the operation, whether 
under the name of Cache Valley Dairy Association or 
Dairy Distributors, Inc. was plainly .and simply Gossner 
-no one else. 
AMBULATORY PICKETING - Continued 
Next, respondent grapples with the real problems 
involved in ambulatory picketing. In this field of the 
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law distinctions are finely drawn and it is obvious thac 
the Courts, as we mentioned in our brief, have found 
this p.art of the Act to be not without its problems of 
interpretation and application. V'l e again emphasize that 
the jury was given no satisfactory guide as to how to 
apply the law to the f.acts. We believe, however, that the 
analysis of the problem which we now propose, in view 
of the cases which respondent cites, will show that appel-
lants should be given a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
First, we reiterate that if the Court sees, as we do, a 
complete failure to prove any inducement of neutral em-
ployees to concerted action, there is no need to consider 
the problem of ambulatory picketing. This problem can 
be present only after such inducen1ent has been estab-
lished. 
The ~Ioore Dry Dock case is an important landmark 
case because it gives .an essential guide which Congress 
failed to supply and because the Circuit Courts of ~1..p­
peal .and the U.S. Supre1ne ·Court have seen its good 
sense and have approved it. ~1..lthough supplying a valu-
able guide a~ this ease did, it neYertheless 1nade the ap-
plieation of its rules no le~s technical or difficult to the 
fad nal va rietiPs to cOiue up for decision. ~1..s the person-
nell of the Board has changed in recent years, it would 
.app<>ar to son1e that the Board has been deYeloping a 
rP~t rid ivP ft'ndpney ag-ainst picketing aetivity, encroach-
ing, a~ it is believPd, upon the rights reserved to unions 
in paragraph 13 of tl1e Aet. This restrictive tendency is 
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well noted by the Fifth Circuit Court in the Sales 
Drivers case (37 LLRM 2166), wherein the Court refused 
to approve the Board's too "rigid rule." 
This "rigid rule'' is: That if the primary employer 
had a permanent place of business at which picketing 
can be effectively carried on, any picketing must be 
limited to such a place, even though there are places 
elsewhere where the company does business at a common 
site with other workers; and this rule applies even though 
picketing at the common situs conforms to the Moore 
Dry Dock formula. The Fifth Circuit Court refuses to 
accept such a rigid rule and states that: 
"Section 8 (B) ( 4) (A) does not contain a 
provision which condemns concerted .activity of 
employees with respect to their own employer 
merely because it occurs at a place where it comes 
to the attention of and incidentally affects em-
ployees of another, even where the activity could 
be carried on at a place where the primary em-
ployer .alone does business. The existence of a 
common site, of such incidental effect, and of 
another place which can be picketed, are factors 
to be considered in determining whether or not 
the section has been violated, but alone are not 
conclusive. The presence of these factors does not 
warrant a failure to consider other facts which 
are relevant and perhaps countervailing." 
The particular "countervailing" factors in this 
Sales Drivers case were that the drivers of the trucks 
spent 25 per cent of their working time .at their employ-
er's permanent plants, 25 per cent enroute, and 50 per 
cent at construction sites. Such factors, said the Court, 
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warranted picketing at the common situs and if such 
picketing complied with the Moore Dry Dock criteria, it 
would be lawful even if neutrals were adversely affected. 
Now, if all the primary employees always work at 
the permanent situs and no percentage of their time is 
spent away from it, or if they are all there at least a 
part of every working day, then that is an important 
factor which would weigh heavily against the lawfulness 
of picketing elsewhere. But here again we should not 
like to see a rigid rule adopted saying that such a 
factor is necessarily conclusive, although such appears 
to be a most important, if not conclusive, factor in the 
Associated 1Iusicians case and the United Steel \Yorkers 
case which respondent cites. In the Associated Musicians 
case, none of the musicians ever appeared at the common 
situs. In the United Steel \Yorkers case all the empoyees 
concerned were continuously employed at the permanent 
situs. These are crucial differences which distinguish 
these cases from the instant ease, and it should be re-
membered that this is an area of law where fine dis-
tinctions are, indeed, controlling . 
. A~ a source for this rigid rule, the Board relies upon 
it~ own decision in the \Yashington Coca Cola Bottling 
c·:u~P, 33 L'R~I 11~. In tl1at case as ''ith the Sales 
Drivers en~<'. thP per1uanent place of business and the 
c•.om11wn situs wrrP within the san1e conununity or general 
an•a. when• if picketing i~ done at one place, it is reason-
ahl<' to ~u ppo~r it would be newsworthy in the entire 
<·omn1uni ty and therefore, says the Board, picketing need 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only be performed at the permanent situs because it 
would become a matter of common knowledge in the 
entire area eoncerned, and the primary employees would 
thus be informed of the dispute. As seen, the Sales 
Drivers case rejects this restrictive view. Thus, the Board 
but not the Circuit Court, has made the distance between 
the permanent situs and the common situs .an important 
factor, a factor which was also referred to in the Schultz 
Refrigerated case. In the Schultz case, importance was 
attached to the f.act that the respective sites were in dif-
ferent states, and it was said that since the permanent 
situs was in New Jersey, it made sense to permit picket-
ing of the trucks in New York where it appears the trucks 
always stayed. 
In the case now before the Court, the distance be-
tween the two sites was 2000 miles. The respondent's 
drivers were constantly on the move between Smithfield 
and New York, and it would take as much as two weeks 
for a round trip when a single driver was used. Any 
advertising of the dispute at the permanent situs might 
take as much as two weeks to get the message to the 
drivers carrying this long haul, and getting the message 
to the drivers was the important thing, because trans-
portation was the key to Gossner 's successful operation 
and we believe it is a too rigid rule to say that the union 
cannot choose its place to picket as between where the 
cheese is loaded or unloaded, especially in view of the 
''straight line'' operation involved here, and the great 
distance between the two points. 
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But there is a 1nore important reason for picketing 
the truck on a public street at the Dorman entrance. It 
is that the Union wanted to notify the public in New 
York and thereby prevail directly upon Dorman- not 
through Dorman's employees. The appellants knew that 
the Dorn1an brothers were sensitive to public opinion 
concerning the source of the cheese they were marketing 
in New York, and that Dorman was also sensitive to what 
the local union leader, Ristuccia, might think if it were 
advertised to the public by picketing that Dorman was 
buying ''hot" cheese. Dorman did not want this made 
public ( tr :246). That it was an inescapable conclusion 
that this was Dorman's only concern of the picketing 
and that he was not concerned about what any employee 
might think is made evident when one reflects that 
every load of cheese was unloaded exactly when Dorman 
ordered it, and that there was no doubt in Dorman's mind 
that every load of cheese which was yet to come from 
Gossner, whether by Dairy Distributor, Inc. or Cache 
Valley Dairy Association, would continue to be unloaded 
as ordered ( tr 298, 299). By picketing a vehicle on wheels 
on a public street within all the standards of the Moore 
Dry Dock case, appellants pursued a legal right reserved 
to them by the Act. 
While appellants firmly believe that the evidence 
warrants a determination by this ·Court that the picket-
ing in this case w.as an1bulatory, primary picketing as 
a matter of law, we now conclude this part of our 
rebuttal .argtnnent with the observation that it was 
palpable error for the Trial Court to submit the 
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case to the jury without an instruction involving the 
Moore Dry Dock criteria, which instruction was re-
quested by appellants, but denied by the trial court. 
Point No. II 
Under Point II of plaintiff's brief, it states: 
"Joseph Ballew testified that he was in Utah 
as an employee and representative of the Western 
States Dairy Employees Council, a division of 
the Western Conference of Teamsters." (tr 141) 
"Ballew by his own statement was in Utah 
as a representative of the Western Conference 
to assist local unions 'in negotiation of contracts, 
disputes or strikes of employees' rights'." ( tr 
142) 
An examination of the record at page 141 or page 
142 and allother pages fails to show a statement that 
Ballew was an employee or agent of the Western Con-
ference of Teamsters. 
In order for plaintiff to recover a valid judgment 
against the Western Conference of Teamsters, it must 
prove three principle points, to wit: 
1. That the Western Conference of Teamsters was 
a labor union 'Or organization within the statutory defi-
nition. 
2. That Ballew was an agent of the Western Con-
ference of Teamsters. 
3. That Ballew acted within the scope of his em-
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The burden is upon plaintiff to prove all three of 
the above vital points. The constitution of the Western 
Conference of Teamsters was not introduced. If it had 
been, we would perhaps have known whether employees 
participated in the Western Conference of Teamsters' 
affairs or whether the Conference was empowered to 
bargain. No member of the Western Conference of 
Teamsters testified. If the Conference is composed of 
employee members or had members at all they probably 
would have known the purposes and functions of the 
Conference. No officer was produced to testify whether 
the Conference had members or whether employees par-
ticipated or whether the Conference existed for the 
purpose in whole or in part in dealing with employers 
concerning labor disputes and wages, etc. as the statutory 
definition requires. The record is silent in such respect 
except for the negative testimony of Ballew, who was 
produced by the plaintiff and testified: 
''It (The Western Conference of Teamsters) 
isn't .a labor union as such. It doesn't negotiate or 
anything of that nature." (tr 150) 
Both Messrs. Ballew .and Rash testified for plain-
tiff and both testified Ballew was an mnployee of the 
Western States Dairy Employee Council. ( tr 126 and 
141) 
No witness testified that Mr. Ballew was an em-
ployee or agent of the Western Conference of Team-
sters or that Ballew at any time at all ever assumed 
to act or acted in the scope of his employment as an agent 
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or employee of the Western Conference of Teamsters 
before, during or after the time Joint Council 67 picketed 
the Gossner truck on the public street adjacent to the 
Dorman Plant. The plaintiff's cause in such respect 
being tied to Ballew, it failed upon all three 8ignal 
points. 
Plaintiff cites the case of International Long Shore-
man's Union vs. Hawaiian Pineapple Company, :226 
Federal 2nd, 875, 37 LLRM 2056. We have read the case 
carefully. It was enmeshed in a back ground of some 
violence and if we have a ticket on plaintiff's train of 
though; there is no comfort in that case for plaintiff. On 
the contrary one Matt Meeham was the principal actor 
and the Court instructed the jury as a matter of law 
that Meeham and four others were representatvves and 
agents of the IL U. The Court significantly stated a Horn 
book agency principal, applicable in such behalf as fol-
lows: 
Of course the Local and International ab-
stractedly could do nothing. Things, if done by 
them, had to be done by officers, agents or mem-
bers then authorized or subsequently rati;fiJed." 
(emphasis ours) 
The case of United Mine Workers of America vs. 
Patton, 211, Fed. 2nd 272, is cited by plaintiff. We have 
also studied that case and on the question of damages 
it is fatal to the theory of damages upon which this 
cause was submitted to the jury; and on the question of 
agency the Court holds that the International was en-
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gaged in organizing independent mines through its Dis-
trict 28 field men. In other words, District 28 and District 
50 and the United Mine Workers of America are the 
same thing, the Court held. 
Regardless of what the facts may or may not be, 
the Court and the parties here are bound by this record, 
hut it is pretty much a matter of public notice that 
United Mine Worker Districts are the organizing arms 
of the International. Whereas, in the Teamster organi-
zation, the conferences, councils and locals function in 
their respective spheres by themselves and for the most 
part entirely independent of any other organization in 
or out of the teamster establishment. Hence, when a 
field man calls a strike as was done in the Patton case, 
that was the act of the International and the Court so 
held. If a teamster council finds itself shorthanded and 
wants to borrow a picket from a sister organization to 
advertise a greivance and Lott is borrowed from Team-
ster Local 983 (which for some reason was not sued) and 
Ballew borrowed fr01n the Western States Dairy Em-
ployees Council (which also ·was not sued); such call for 
assistance, does not make or create liability on the part 
of Local Union 983, or the Western States Dairy Em-
ployees Council, simply because such local and such 
council responded to a request for help, and such per-
son so loaned was expressly and exclusively under the 
direction and control of the lo.anee while so on loan. 
Respecting the sueability of the International 
Union, plaintiff has stressed the idea that this record 
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shows that Local Union 976, the Western States Dairy 
Employees Council, the Western Conference of Team-
sters and the Teamster International Union are one and 
the same thing. Possibly, upon the theory that :L\Iurray is 
a part of or an affiliate of Utah or the United States. 
Significantly, plaintiff omits to connect the Inter-
national Union with the party and the only party that 
engaged in the picketing; namely, Joint Council 67. Lott 
and Rash were officers of Joint Council 67, but under 
common law agency rules this alone does not make the 
different respective local unions of which they were 
respective sercetaries, responsible for the action of the 
Joint Council in this case. 
There is nothing in the record that discloses that the 
International does, c.an or may collect dues or per capita 
tax from the Joint Council or that it does, can or may 
control its affairs or ever attempted to. The presumption 
from this record is that Joint Council 67 pays dues and 
per capita tax to no one, that no one on the outside 
interferes with its functions and decisions, that it is a 
complete and fully officered organization unto itself, that 
it has certain duties to perform and performs them 
strictly independent of the International and entirely 
without its consent or knowledge. 
Upon what theory the trial court refused to dismiss 
the International after making the observation it did 
(tr 341), we do not know, but certainly it was not upon 
any valid theory of agency or otherwise that had been 
brought to our attention. The only membership that 
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could possibly act from a concerted standpoint was that 
of Local 277, which local took no action and did no picket-
ing. Lott was secretary of Local 983 but it did no pic-
keting. Rash was Secretary of Local 976 and it did no 
picketing. Ballew was on loan from the Western State~ 
Dairy Employees Council and it did no picketing. The 
picketing that occurred w.as engaged in by the Joint 
Council only, and an examination of the record discloses 
no connection between the International Union and the 
Joint Council, or that the International Union was even 
aware of what the Joint Council was doing. 
Wherefore, we respectfully submit the refusal of 
the Court to dismiss the International Union from this 
cause, was manifest error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
A. PARK SMOOT 
and 
ELIAS HANSEN 
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